OBLIVIATE redesigned ORAM for SGX filesystem operations for confuse access patterns to protect user privacy.

Why

All existing SGX filesystems are vulnerable to system call snooping, page fault, or cache based side-channel attacks.

How

• Run isolated filesystem enclave in a separate process and using encrypted communication channels to communicate with applications.
• Using message queues and shared memory for intra-process and inter-process communication.
• ORAM implementation is exposed to side-channel attacks against the enclave. -> Use data oblivious algorithms in accessing key data structures of ORAM.
• Maintain ORAM server storage efficiently -> Additional security memory region with non-encrypted memory regions of SGX (Avoid costly context switches).
• Reduce ORAM latency -> Asynchronous ORAM server update (Returns the required data when available and performs path updates asynchronously, rather than waiting for expensive ORAM path updates).

What

Data oblivious filesystem for Intel SGX which adapting the ORAM protocol to read and write data from a file within an SGX enclave. It supports SGX programs without changes in application layer.

Some Detail

• Introduce three current SGX Filesystem with their limitations.
• Test current SGX filesystem with Syscall Snooping Attack, Page Fault based Attack, Cache Based Attacks to show their hidden dangers -> Lead to the design of OBLIVIATE.
• Evaluation
  • Security test
  • Micro Benchmark -> Running Speed, Overhead, Optimization impact.
  • Macro Benchmark -> Compare OBLIVIATE and other filesystems on real world test: SQLite & Lighttpd.